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Abstract - In this paper we analyze the effect of different legislature and constituency size on per capita regional 
expenditure in Italy. According to the theory, legislature size has an indefinite effect on government spending 
because logrolling and transaction costs may have canceling effects. In turn, smaller constituency size is 
predicted to decrease government spending, because of homogeneity of interests and low monitoring costs. We 
find a large and significantly positive effect of the number of legislators and a negative effect for constituency 
size. We use these findings to forecast the effects of the increase in the number of legislators that are occurring 
in some regions. 
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1.  Introduction 
  The economic theory of government has modeled fiscal policy in democratic 
regimes as the result of competition between different pressure groups. One class of 
models developed in this line of research has investigated the relationship between 
state government expenditure and legislature size. According to these models, two 
features of the political-institutional system are especially relevant in explaining 
excessive government spending: the number of legislative districts (Weingast et al., 
1981) and the number of seats in a state’s legislature (Gilligan and Matsusaka, 1995). 
This is consistent with the theoretical hypothesis that logrolling leads representatives 
to spend more than their constituents would like, as common pool problems arise from 
the tax base and the benefits of a given spending project are internalized by an 
individual constituent group, while the costs are spread over the entire population. 
Yet, despite its widespread acceptance as a conceptual proposition, this hypothesis has 
received mixed support from the existing evidence. In addition, most of the empirical 
contributions focus on the American institutional setting.  
  In this paper we build upon the literature outlined above and examine regional 
government expenditure in Italy from 1980 to 2000. Specifically, we attempt to test 
the effect of the number of regional legislators and constituency size on regional 
spending. Two parallel processes have occurred in the Italian administrative regions in 
the last few years. First, the regions have been invested with the power to write their 
own constitutions (Statutes), which policy makers tend to use to expand the 
legislature. Second, an important process of devolution of tax rates has occurred. As 
these processes of regional institutional and fiscal reform are still in progress, this 
paper aims to highlight some indications on how important legislative structure is to 
explain spending behavior in Italian regions. This may be relevant in an evaluation of 
ongoing changes and to gain a picture of the new institutional setting of these 
jurisdictions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature; 
Section 3 illustrates the reform that has taken place in the institutional structure of the 
Italian regions over the last few years; in Section 4 we describe the data and specify the  
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variables used for the empirical analysis. We then present the results in Section 5, and 
Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  Literature review 
  Since the seminal contribution of Stigler (1976), the size of legislature has been 
seen to play a pivotal role in explaining the production of legislation and the general 
tendency of government to grow over time. Crain (1979) finds that the linkage 
between legislative output and the size of a legislature is not predictable a priori. This 
is because a larger legislature could be associated either with higher production costs 
required for assembling legislative majorities or, alternatively, with lower decision 
making costs if the returns from increased labor specialization in the committee 
apparatus dominate the effect of larger sized groups on decision making costs. The 
results are contrasting: lower price of votes leads to an increase in government size 
and vice versa higher decision making costs reduce the government size.   
  McCormick and Tollison (1981) formalize the problem of an interest group 
deciding how much to spend on buying legislative influence, and its agent (lobby) 
deciding how to allocate this budget (E) across the two houses of the legislature in 
order to maximize the organization’s return from legislative influence. The 
organization knows that the votes (V) it will receive in the two houses are a function 
of its expenditure in each house (E
h and E




h, h) and V
s = V
s(E
s, s). The problem faced by the interest group 
is to maximize the net returns from legislative influence Yn = Y – E subject to E = E
h 
+ E
s, Y = Y(V
h, V
s, L, W, P), and the previous vote functions, where W is the wealth 
of the community, P is the population, and L is legislative size. Larger legislature size 
(defined as the sum of the lower and upper houses) has an indefinite effect on 
government spending. On the one hand, an increase in the number of legislators 
results in a lower cost of lobbying because of additional competition between vote 
suppliers. Furthermore, when the total number of legislators increases, there are 
potential gains from increased specialization of labor within the committee apparatus. 
On the other hand, as long as the number of legislators increases, the transaction costs  
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needed to find a viable majority of votes are also increased. In the end, the problem is 
an empirical one. 
 Weingast  et al. (1981) provide a formal model on the size of legislatures, in 
which they consider each chamber in itself, rather than the overall number of 
legislators. The main testable restriction of this model is that government spending 
increases as the number of legislative districts increases. To summarize, let bi(x) be 
the benefit to the constituents of legislator i of spending x dollars in district i, and let 
c(x) be the cost of spending. The efficient level of spending is such that b’i(x) = c’(x). 
If there are n districts and taxes are spread evenly across the districts, the legislator i 
bears (1/n)
th of the cost of spending in district i. Therefore, legislator i pushes x up to 
the point in which b’i(x) = (1/n)c’(x). This implies that the optimal level of spending 
for each legislator is increasing in n. If legislators logroll and defer to each other 
regarding such expenditure, then the total spending is increasing in n. This implication 
is called “the Law of 1/n”. 
Shughart and Tollison (1986) find a positive relationship between real per 
capita government spending and the number of public and private bills enacted into 
law. The results hold in the long-run, using data from US states for legislature and 
laws ranging from 1889 to 1980. Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995), after controlling for 
constituent interests, show the number of seats in the upper house to be positively 
associated with per capita state and local direct general expenditure. Furthermore, a 
large legislature leads to higher spending in both capital and non-capital programs, 
welfare, education and highway expenditures. Possibly, these results do not extend to 
lower chamber because bicameralism is not taken into account as an explanatory 
variable.   
A different measure of legislature size has been explored by the subsequent 
literature. Thornton and Ulrich (1999) argue that constituency size, defined as the 
number of constituents per legislator, is the relevant size variable in the determination 
of government spending, rather than the absolute size of the legislature. They maintain 
that a larger ratio reduces monitoring of representatives by voters, enabling the 
representatives to be less accountable and to deviate from their preferences. In 
addition, a larger constituency encompasses more interest groups calling for  
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representation and transfers. They show that larger constituency size produces a 
higher level of state government spending per capita both in the upper and lower 
chambers in US States. 
 Finally, Bradbury and Crain (2001) analyze a panel of 24 bicameral countries 
and 14 unicameral countries for the period 1971-1989. The results support the positive 






3.   A closer look at Italian regional government  
Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan Areas, Regions and the State constitute 
the Italian Republic. The autonomy of these jurisdictions  is an important feature of the 
Italian political and institutional system. The 1948 Constitution  states that the regions, 
provinces and municipalities are autonomous entities, with their own Statutes, powers 
and functions (art. 114). The regions of Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-
Alto Adige and Valle d’Aosta enjoy particular forms of autonomy, according to their 
special Statutes adopted by constitutional law. Furthermore, the Trentino-Alto Adige 
region encompasses the Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano (art. 116).  
The Constitution also establishes the regional branches of government, which 
are the Council, the Cabinet and its President. While the Council exercises the 
legislative power granted to the Region and all other functions conferred on it by the 
Constitution and by law, the Cabinet is the executive branch of regional government. 
The rules that regulate the functions and the mechanism of election or appointment of 
such bodies of government have changed during our sample period. Until the reform 
passed in February 1995, the Council was elected under a proportional system and the 
legislators held office for a 5-year term. The number of legislators varied according to 
the regional population
2 and, in the regions with special Statutes, was established by the 
relevant Statute. The Council appointed the Cabinet, which was composed of the 
President and a certain number of members, usually called “assessori”.  
The changes occurred in the political and institutional scenario of the early ‘90s 
and the difficulties in reaching stable governments led to an important reform of the  
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regional and local government electoral system. The reform has modified both the 
electoral system and the tenure length of regional legislators. In 1995 the mechanism by 
which the members of the regional Council are elected switched from a pure 
proportional representation system to a mixed one. Specifically, 80 percent of the 
legislators are elected on the basis of provincial lists (art. 1, par. 2) and the remaining 20 
percent by a majoritarian system on the basis of regional lists (art. 1, par.  3). A 
premium for the majority in two steps was also introduced, so that the absolute majority 
of the legislators will be held by the coalition linked to the regional list that has obtained 
the relative majority of the votes.
3 Furthermore, the law reduces the tenure length of the 
Council from five to two years if the relationship of confidence between the Council 
and the Cabinet breaks down during the first two years. The law was first applied in the 
1995 regional elections.  
Art. 122 (par. 1) was modified by a constitutional law passed in 1999. It states 
that the President of the regional Cabinet is elected by universal and direct suffrage, 
unless the regional Statute establishes otherwise. The elected President appoints and 
dismisses the members of the regional Cabinet. The first direct election of the President 
took place in the 2000 regional elections. The constitutional law of 1999 also gives the 
regions the opportunity to write their own statutes (art. 123). The statute determines the 
form of government and the fundamental principles of the organization and functioning 
of the Region, in accordance with the Constitution. In other words, the regions can 
choose their own form of government and electoral rules, within some boundaries. In 
particular, they can set the number of legislators. Table 1 reports the current and 
proposed number of regional legislators according to draft regional constitutions. 
Twelve out of twenty regions plan to increase the number of legislators. This change 
will come into effect during the regional elections in 2005. Data in Table 1 shows the 
variety in the number of legislators in Italian regions (from 30 in Molise and Umbria to 
90 in Sicily), and highlights the large variation in the ratio of inhabitants to legislators 
(which ranges from as few as 3,445 in Valle d’Aosta to as many as 114,096 in 
Lombardy). The current changes do not modify the range of legislators or inhabitants-




[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
4.  Variables and data 
  Virtually no changes have occurred to the number of legislators in Italian 
regions, with the exception of Apulia, which increased the number of legislators from 
50 to 60 in 1985. For this reason we use cross-sectional data by averaging our data for 
the time span 1980-2000.
4 An important issue concerns the Trentino-Alto Adige 
(TAA) region and its constituent provinces Bolzano and Trento. Unlike all other 
Italian regions, for historical and ethnic reasons, TAA has very limited power, which 
is devolved to the two provinces. Italian statistics put the two provinces together with 
the other regions.  For this reason TAA and its provinces may represent outliers, 
therefore we check the consistency of the results with and without them.
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 The  benchmark  specifications are: 
     
  i i i i i i OR TRANS GDP LEG EXP ε α α α α α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 ,    (1) 
 
  i i i i i i OR TRANS GDP CS EXP ε β β β β β + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 ,    (2) 
 
where  EXP i s regional expenditure, LEG is the number of legislators, CS is 
constituency size defined as the population-to-legislators ratio, using population as a 
proxy for voters, GDP is regional gross domestic product, TRANS represents transfers 
from the national government, OR indicates the revenue raised by the region itself, 
and  i ε  is a stochastic error.
6 In the light of the previous discussion, we expect both 
LEG and CS to be positive. All data are in real per capita terms (1995 base = 100), 
and are expressed in euros. Data on expenditure, transfers, and own revenue are taken 
from Istat (various years). GDP and population are taken from Crenos (2004). Table 2 
reports the summary statistics for the above variables.
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5.  Results 
  We first analyze the effect of different legislature sizes. Estimates (1) – (4) 
include all twenty regions plus the two autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano, 
while equation (5) excludes them. Finally, equation (6) also excludes the Trentino-
Alto Adige region. The same procedure applies for constituency size. 
In Table 3 the estimates concerning LEG are positive, quite large and 
significant at the 1% level, with the exception of (6) where the size of the coefficient 
is reduced, as well as its significance level. These estimates tell us that a 10% increase 
in the number of legislators leads to a 22.7% increase in regional per capita spending 
for estimates (1-5), and this is reduced to 15.6% in the last estimate. GDP is always 
negative but insignificant, whilst TRANS is significantly positive, with an increasing 
significance level, as long as the sample is progressively refined to exclude possible 
outliers. OR is never significant. TRANS is probably a more important determinant of 
regional government expenditure than OR because while monetary transfers play an 
important role in the policy of cohesion between North and South; regional taxes have 
not played a major role in regional public finances until the last decade. To avoid 
possible correlation between GDP on the one hand, and transfers and revenue on the 
other hand (negative and positive, respectively) we exclude GDP from some 
estimates. These results do not modify previous ones but slightly reduce the 
explicative power of the estimated equations. Reducing the sample improves the 
results, but it does not change the qualitative results we are mainly interested in. The 
estimated equations explain about 60% of the variability of regional expenditure - 
which is quite satisfactory - and the joint significance of the variables (F test) is high.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 reports results for constituency size. CS is significantly positive as 
expected, at the highest significance level. These estimates maintain that a 10% 
increase in the constituency size leads to a 10.6%  increase in regional per capita  
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spending. The other variables basically confirm the above results. However, moving 
from the complete to the reduced sample, the estimated size of the coefficient of OR is 
significantly positive, and the size of the coefficient of TRANS  (but not its 
significance) increases. The estimated equations explain on average more than 70% of 
the variability of regional expenditure in estimates (1) – (4), and more than 80% in the 
last two columns and the variables are again jointly different from zero at the 1% 
significance level.   
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
  In this cross-section it is impossible to use a dummy variable for the electoral 
reform from 1995 onwards. Averaging the observations will lead to a variable that has 
the same value for all the observations, making regressors linearly dependent. However, 
the shift towards an institutional system in which the President is de facto directly 
elected, regional governments last longer, legislators are elected according to a mixed 
system, and there is greater accountability than before, may constitute a structural 
change. Therefore, we re-estimate our cross-section using only data from 1995 to 2000.   
 Results  in both tables are consistent with previous estimates. With respect to 
LEG we observe a reduction in the absolute value of the coefficient (although the 
significance level is still the highest), but when expressed in logs a 10% increase in the 
number of legislators leads to a typical 22.3% increase in per capita regional 
government spending, which is very similar to highest estimates for the whole sample. 
Yet, other variables do not appear to be affected by the reduced sample, and the R
2 and 
the F statistic perform less well than before. Table 6 confirms this for CS, where a 10% 
increase in constituency size commands an 11.1% increase in spending. Other variables 
basically perform as in the whole sample. Notably, TRANS is smaller and less 
significant, and GDP is now significant when possible outliers are removed. In this case 
the ability of the estimates to describe the variability of government spending and the 
joint significance of the variables involved in the regressions are as good as before.  
 
[Table 5 about here]  
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[Table 6 about here] 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have analyzed the effect of different legislature and 
constituency sizes on regional government spending. An increase in the number of 
legislators induces an increase in regional expenditure in both models. Regional 
expenditure also appears to be linked to the size of national transfers but neither to 
revenue raised by the regional authority nor to the regional GDP. However, these 
results are less consistent than those related to legislature and constituency size.  
Our estimates allow us to forecast a significant increase in government 
spending per capita in the regions that are enlarging their legislatures using the 
window of opportunity created by new Statutes. At a minimum, our estimates suggest 
a 15.6% increase in per capita spending for a 10% increase in the number of 
legislators. These results are confirmed when we concentrate our analysis on the period 
1995-2000, in which an institutional reform was in place. This effect is not in line with 
current attempts to curb government spending in Italy, and potentially places the 
efforts of regional policies in contrast with national goals. We believe that this kind of 
Public Choice analysis should be considered before designing and implementing 
institutional reforms. 
  The interplay between the aim of the paper, data and related econometric 
technique leaves aside interesting issues such as the effects of the electoral reform and 











1 Bradbury and Crain (2001) also find that the effect is far greater in unicameral legislatures than in 
bicameral legislatures; furthermore, while the size of the lower chamber is positively related to 
government expenditure, the sign of the upper chamber is negative.  
2 On the basis of the law passed in 1968 (n. 108) the number of regional legislators is 80 for regions with 
more than six million inhabitants; 60 for regions with more than four million inhabitants; 50 for regions 
with more than three million inhabitants; 40 for regions with more than one million inhabitants and, 
finally, 30 in all other regions. This relationship between regional population and legislature size makes 
possible endogeneity between regional government spending and legislature size irrelevant (according to 
the argument that says that higher government spending needs more legislators because of increased 
specialization).   
3 To allow for this premium, the number of legislators can be increased if votes do not provide such a 
majority when translated into seats. This is the case of Abruzzo and Calabria in our sample.  
4 Although the population shows some changes, the time variation of CS is also very limited, therefore we 
decided to use a cross-section in this case too.  
5 We have not estimated the equations without special statute regions in order to avoid the problem of 
having too few observations compared with the number of parameters. 
6 To capture healthcare spending, the major outlay in Italian regions, we experimented the variable 
PROP65 (the proportion of citizens aged over 65) but it turned out to be insignificant in all cases, and it 
has been dropped from estimations. This is possibly due to the role of the National Healthcare Fund that 
administered the transfers from the central government to the regions until 2000. 
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Abruzzo 43 50 29,797 25,625
Apulia   60 70 68,110 58,380
Basilicata 30 40 20,160 15,120
Calabria 43 54 47,518 37,838
Campania   60 80 96,371 72,278
Emilia Romagna  50 65 80,173 61,671
Friuli Venezia Giulia  60 60 19,810 19,810
Lazio 60 71 88,372 74,680
Liguria   40 51 40,525 31,784
Lombardy 80 80 114,096 114,096
Marche   40 42 36,730 34,980
Molise   30 30 10,906 10,906
Piedmont   60 60 71,495 71,495
Sardinia   80 80 20,600 20,600
Sicily 90 90 56,408 56,408
Tuscany 50 65 70,952 54,578
Trentino Alto Adige  70 70 13,473 13,473
Umbria 30 37 28,016 22,715
Valle d’Aosta  35 35 3,445 3,445
Veneto 60 60 75,681 75,681


















Table 2 – Summary statistics, overall sample 
 Mean  S.D. Min Max 
CS 47,399  30,043 3,841  111,520 
EXP 373.941  292.006 6.066  1026.981 
GDP 15700.751  5189.284 8865.412  28436.247 
LEG 48.682  17.404 30.000 90.000 
OR 223.908  452.823 5.252  2149.576 










































Table 3 – Legislature size and regional expenditure, 1980-2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C  74.747      
(42.857) 
88.492*     
(41.623) 
102.744*   
(51.865) 
136.442*    
(64.954) 
106.725    
(64.464) 
116.920*    
(62.161) 
LEG  11.499***   
(2.734) 








8.417**     
(3.282) 
GDP  -0.012     
(0.014) 
-0.016    
(0.013) 
    -0.020     
(0.026) 
-0.045    
(0.029) 
OR  0.016     
(0.099) 
  -0.034    
(0.098) 
-0.041   
(0.096) 
0.007     
(0.117) 
0.018     
(0.110) 
TRANS  2.437*      
(1.187) 




  3.861** 
(1.256) 
8.571***    
(2.424) 
Adj-R
2  0.618 0.618 0.589  0.581  0.574  0.608 
Obs.  22 22 22  22  20  19 
F  6.891*** 9.703*** 8.611***  13.191***  5.054***  7.736*** 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 

































Table 4 – Constituency size and regional expenditure, 1980-2000 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C  151.877     
(97.744) 
159.148**   
(63.797) 
148.83*    
(62.196) 
153.842**   
(65.439) 
357.738**




CS  7.933***    
(1.295) 
7.546***    
(1.294) 
8.544***   
(1.224) 
8.142***    
(1.203) 
8.983***   
(1.060) 
7.863***    
(1.131) 




    -0.013     
(0.021) 
-0.066    
(0.047) 
OR  0.722       
(1.784) 
  1.094     
(1.882) 
0.649     
(0.555) 
0.233***   
(0.072) 
0.194**    
(0.069) 
TRANS  1.227**   
(0.573) 
-0.633     
(0.567) 
1.838***   
(0.558) 
  4.323*    
(2.229) 
4.110**     
(2.824) 
Adj-R
2  0.757 0.731 0.734  0.710  0.852  0.871 
Obs.  22 22 22  22  20  19 
F  13.271*** 16.276***  16.570***  23.244***  21.548***  23.411*** 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 







































Table 5 – Legislature size and regional expenditure, 1995-2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C  118.899     
(96.855) 
118.113     
(86.987) 
79.832*     
(35.951) 
33.639*     
(23.387) 
35.721*    
(20.003) 
32.299**    
(14.471) 
LEG  2.844***    
(0.969) 
2.839***    
(0.911) 
2.673***    
(0.783) 
2.4799***   
(0.781) 
3.219***   
(0.981) 
2.807***    
(0.957) 
GDP  1.021      
(3.243) 
1.011      
(3.114) 
   11.036*    
(5.998) 
3.958      
(7.819) 
OR  0.0133   
(0.685) 
  0.020   
(0.659) 
0.815   
(0.653) 
0.326   
(0.706) 
0.533   
(0.677) 
TRANS  0.842*     
(0.441) 
0.539     
(0.507) 
0.707**    
(0.319) 





2  0.419  0.419       0.416  0.364  0.442  0.489 
Obs.  22 22 22 22 20  19 
F  3.076** 4.343** 4.283** 5.429**  2.968*  3.359*** 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 

































Table 6 – Constituency size and regional expenditure, 1995-2000 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C  17.580**    
(6.504) 
24.711**    
(9.168) 
20.776*    
(15.714) 
14.998      
(12.701) 
18.090**   
(8.676) 
18.055*     
(11.754) 
CS  1.993***    
(0.315) 
1.958***    
(0.298) 
2.048***   
(0.299) 
2.012***    
(0.285) 
2.172***   
(0.344) 
2.029***    
(0.383) 
GDP  1.258      
(1.862) 
1.323      
(1.816) 
    6.538*    
(4.109) 
8.419**    
(4.324) 
OR  0.209   
(0.457) 
  0.232   
(0.449) 
0.329    
(0.504) 
0.516   
(0.516) 
0.371   
(0.545) 
TRANS  1.213***    
(0.308) 
1.256***    
(0.296) 
1.149**    
(0.511) 
  1.313***   
(0.391) 
1.633***    
(0.534) 
Adj-R
2  0.740 0.737 0.733  0.729  0.737  0.726 
Obs.  22 22 22  22  20  19 
F  12.143*** 16.886*** 16.483***  25.571***  10.536***  9.284*** 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
                                                 
 